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“did somebody say ‘transition’?” 
A Critical intervention into the use 
of a notion
From the time of its introduction, the concept of ‘transition’ 
has effected a tectonic shift in our understanding 
of post-socialism. In the process which has taken place 
during the last couple of decades after the collapse of East 
European socialist regimes, it has become transformed 
from one of the signifiers of the political and social change 
which occurred into a cornerstone for thinking, analyzing 
and predicting the future of post-socialism. Furthermore, 
in this article it is posited that all the political and social  
processes occurring in the ex-socialist countries are defined 
in relation to transition as an all-encompassing form 
of post-socialist experience. Relying on the discursive 
theory of Ernesto Laclau, this article attempts to consider 
together the usually separated questions of epistemology 
and ontology, and to ask what is the connection between 
scientific origins of the concept of transition and its political 
legitimacy. We claim that transition is a “sutured“ structure 
composed of various social experiences and political 
strategies, which naturalizes and universalizes the contingent 
power struggles that are taking place and will take place 
in the future of post-socialist countries. Therefore, severing 
the existing bonds between transition and the actually 
existing post-socialism is a necessary precondition 
for creating a more complex and productive understanding 
of the societies of East and South East Europe.
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Insofar as an act of institution has been successful, a “forgetting of the origins” 
tends to occur; the system of possible alternatives tends to vanish and the traces 
of the original contingency to fade. In this way, the instituted tends 
to assume the form of a mere objective presence.
Laclau 1990, 34
introduction
When the post-history of the dissolution of the East European Bloc 
is written, as well as the consequent transformation of states and societies 
of South-East (SEE) and East Europe (EE) and their accession to the European 
Union (EU), the term ‘transition’ will stand out as the dominant term 
in the understanding of societies of that time. Although its use has been 
ostensibly less than frequent in the last half-decade, if not more, in both 
academia as well as the public, inasmuch as the set of problems which 
it encompassed were apparently over (especially institutional and political 
reforms), with only a few serious contenders transition has been one 
of pivotal terms in the way former socialist societies have narrated their 
transformation from authoritarian societies with planned economies 
to democratic and free market societies.1 As a concept, transition aims 
to completely exhaust the meaning and scope of a certain society – 
in this case that of post-socialism – by encapsulating it in time (“before” 
and “after” transition) and space (“East” and “West”, the Balkans 
and Europe, etc.). It is one of the concepts which is defined as a result 
of painstaking and arduous work carried out by the academic community, 
but the power it yields is based on common sense. In this sense meta-
phors have a privileged role in the (re)production of everyday beliefs, 
thus forming a part of what Foucauldian scholar Giovanna Procacci 
calls savoir – an intermediary discourse between the level of science 
and direct social intervention the aim of which is to “create an object 
upon which [govenmental] intervention is possible” (Procacci 1991, 
157). For example, the metaphors of “a young and fragile democ-
racy” and “learning about democratic political culture” (see Kapstein 
1   Of course, the material for this narrative was abundantly provided by 
Western political science. See Guilhot 2005.
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and Converse 2008, Maldini 2006) are commonly used not only 
in the public domain but among academics as well. In another equally 
illuminating example, the French economist Marie Lavigne speaks 
of transition as a condition of long ill men who, after decades of illness 
and recovery can no longer distinguish between the two states (Lavigne 
1999, see also Buden 2010). The concept of transition possesses a “real” 
existence which remains even after theoretical deconstruction; in most 
cases of critical intervention this ontological dimension is left out due to 
epistemological or theoretical reasons. In this essay we focus on the point 
of convergence between the supposed object – post-socialist experience 
– and its representation – transition. Our aim in this paper is not to add 
to the never-ending list of signifiers representing the SEE and EE states 
by replacing transition with some other concept, but to provide a short 
comparative analysis of transitional societies, or even to put forward 
a more or less comprehensive critical overview of transitional literature. 
We try to put forward a theoretically-driven argument for the overall 
rejection of the concept by accentuating two ongoing processes which 
are of crucial importance for understanding the way the concept 
of ‘transition’ aims to denominate these societies. First, we maintain 
that all political and social processes occurring in former socialist 
countries are defined in relation to transition as a peculiar and contin-
gent (Laclau) form of post-socialist experience, i.e. as something lived 
and not canonized through the political optics of political regimes 
for naming. Second, we argue that by theoretically delineating 
the existing bonds between transition and post-socialist society, 
a necessary precondition is met in order to create a more complex 
and productive understanding of the actuality of the social moment 
which is defined as “transitional”.
Relying on a group of authors usually placed under the heading 
of “post-foundational political theory” (Marchart 2007), most notably 
the work of Argentine political theorist Ernesto Laclau, we aim to analyze 
the way in which the knowledge on post-socialism – and by this we 
mean both science and savoir, scientific knowledge and its political 
operationalization or policy aspects – constructs its object of study. 
Second, we question the discursive operations through which the named 
object achieves ontological consistency: in other words, we attempt to 
intertwine the usually separated questions of epistemology and ontology 
and ask what is the connection between epistemological and political 
legitimacy of transition.
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the knowledge on post-socialism: objectivity, teleology 
and transition
Although the scope of the paper allows only for a brief analysis, it seems 
appropriate to start with a short genealogy of transition, or in Giorgio 
Agamben’s words “the map of the migration of the concept” (Agamben 
1993), providing marks upon which the contemporary use of the concept 
in social sciences is contingent.2 The field of transitology studies was first 
opened up by American political scientist Dankwart Rustow in his work 
„Transitions to democracy: towards a dynamic model” (1970). Rustow 
aimed to disentangle the preconditions of democracy and its institu-
tions while underlining the necessity and role of political consensus. 
His attempt to accentuate political agency over the socio-economic 
and cultural conditions of development theory was continued 
and transformed by the work of two American political theorists 
in the mid-1980s, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. 
Breaking away from the general premises of modernization theory, 
for O’Donnell and Schmitter transition was a concept defined post facto, 
i.e. in retrospect, with the explicit aim of probing the preconditions 
and the openness of transition from authoritarian forms of government 
to capitalism and liberal democracy in South America (O’Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986). Wishing to avoid complex macro-models of social 
change, their minimalist approach defined transition simply as an “(...) inter- 
val between two political regimes” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, cited 
in Jović 2010, 48). The events of 1989 and their aftermath provided 
an ample opportunity to apply the concept in somewhat different 
conditions: the knowledge on post-socialism, which for a short period 
of time found itself in an ontologically and epistemologically open space – 
a sort of interregnum of meaning, a place and time devoid of dominant 
political signifiers – and soon became focused not only on explaining 
or understanding the changes that occurred, more often than not 
haphazardly, but in grasping the historicity of the process by clearly delin- 
eating its determinants and supposed goals.3 In this new context the theory 
2   Having in mind the scope of this article any kind of overview is sketchy 
at best and, at worst, deficient or even misleading. Nonetheless it is necessary to 
show how – throughout the history of its use – the concept was plagued by serious 
theoretical and political issues. For a short but thorough overview, see Guilhot 2002.
3   As shown by Nicholas Guilhot, the concept of transition, which plays 
a pivotal role in the scholarly expertise which aimed to potentially “remodel global 
polity” after the fall of the Berlin Wall, was taken from Marxism and its concept 
of socialism as an intermediate stage towards communism (Guilhot 2005). For the purposes 
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of transition, which up to this moment has more or less accepted its 
epistemological limitations by focusing on insecurity as a main characteristic 
of any systemic change (thus more or less limiting itself to analysis of its 
micro-aspects), turned into a more general approach anticipating 
the future and providing guidelines for the management of political 
conflicts and the development of societies’ full potentials. The ideas 
of progress, universal History, and objective and absolute knowledge 
of the political became the crucial components of this new dispositive 
knowledge. This multidisciplinary body of work with an explicit aim – 
to explain the transformation from socialist to market economy societies – 
become known as transitology. All approaches under this name, regardless 
of their differences, share a premise that transition is a “rational design” 
(Stark 1992), an institutional and political project which had only to be 
implemented on a specific social situation (Carothers 2002, Humphrey 
and Mandel 2002, Marody 1998, Stark 1992).4 This theoretical paradigm 
soon became criticised on a number of levels. Katherine Verdery, 
a prominent anthropologist of post-socialist Europe, criticized transitional 
teleology, claiming that the future condition of the ex-socialist countries 
cannot be “read off” from the development path of Western democracies 
(Verdery 2002). Chris Hann argued that what is needed is a corrective 
to transitology, which to failed to explain the processes that occurred 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Hann 2002). Furthermore, Thomas 
Carothers claims that the Western epistemology is so deeply rooted 
in certain concepts that as a consequence “analysts are in effect trying 
to apply the transition paradigm to the very countries whose political 
evolution is calling that paradigm into question” (Carothers 2002, 10). 
Steven Sampson argued altogether against what he called “the adherence 
to concepts in the study of East European societies“ (Sampson 2002, 298), 
be it, inter alia, “transition”, “integration” (Petsinis 2010) or, somewhat 
of this article we should underline that, together with the takeover of the concept 
from Marxist philosophy, contemporary transitology and political science also inherited 
its problematic use, especially its teleological dimension, which itself was a place 
of continuous debates on the Marxist left. The most prominent debate on the tran- 
sition to communism and its theoretical-political consequences was that insti-
gated by Althusser’s collaborators. For a theoretical overview, see: Etienne Balibar, 
On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. London: New Left Books, 1977, chapter V.
4   This is especially true for the corner-stone of academic knowledge on post-
-socialism: economic science. For example David Turnock, the English specialist 
on Eastern Europe, argues that although the final destination of transition cannot 
be clearly determined since there are multiple Western models (but not because 
it is unachievable as such), each EE society creates its own adaptation by transforming 
its civic virtues (Turnock 1997).
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similarly (and equally Eurocentric), “re-integration” (Pop-Eleches 2009). 
Although fully justified in confronting the attempts at “suturing”5 all 
post-socialist experience under a single signifier, Sampson is nonetheless 
arguing for the use of another concept – “post-postsocialism” – which, 
not unlike like “post-transition” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić 2007) 
is – in its explicit linearity and positivity – as equally plagued by teleological 
obscurity as the other notions he dismisses.
A significant number of authors (Verdery 2002, Hann 2002, Marody 
1997) that took upon themselves to criticize transitological explanations 
did so from the standpoint of normative critique – aiming at the implicit 
political content of the process that was soon to be labelled as “shock-
doctrine” or, a bit later, “neoliberalism” – while only a smaller number 
attempted to provide a critique of its epistemological “horizon” as such. 
Although transitology as a knowledge apparatus has been strongly criti-
cized from its inception, its central concept of ‘transition’ was usually 
taken for granted. The peculiarity of transition as a theoretical form 
is that, on one hand, it plays a pivotal role in the field of post-socialist 
studies by defining the limits to its application, while at the same time 
its definitions differ on a case-by-case basis. Putting aside for now 
the differences between theoretical approaches, the paradigm of transi-
tion involves: 1) a universal view on democratization as a “one-way“ 
process; 2) assigning political elites and institutional factors with 
a crucial role, and 3) neoliberalism and free-market building as its 
normative content (see for example Jankauskas and Gudžinskas, 2007). 
The dominant view of transition as a process – being based on an idea 
of transformation from one social model to another, and therefore defined 
in dichotomies good/bad, favourable/unfavourable, just/unjust etc. – 
is set up against the notion of contingency and the fundamental openness 
of any political regime to change. Therefore, regardless of the criteria 
in question – economic, cultural or political – which differ from author 
to author or from one school of thought to another, the rules for creating 
the definition of the concept are more or less the same. But when writing 
about it, if not using economic-institutional criteria, authors often 
eschew the definition of the concept altogether. For example for Michael 
Heller, paralleling conventional use (such as that of World Development 
Report, 1996), transition refers to “(...) the 28 post-socialist societies 
5   Influenced by the work of Lacanian scholar Jacques Alain Miller (Miller 
2006), political theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe used the Lacanian notion 
of “nodal points” (point de caption), a privileged sign around which the meaning 
of certain discourse is constructed by fixing (or “suturing”) the other signifiers (Laclau 
and Mouffe 2005).
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in which some market-oriented reforms have been adopted but which 
cannot yet be described as fully-formed market economies” (Heller 1998, 
623). We maintain that the deceiving simplicity and lack of precision 
in defining the term (as evident in the example above) is referenced 
to numerous epistemological problems approaching the study of transi-
tion, one of which is the lack of a clear theoretical framework. Since 
not openly over-determined, the crisis of the theoretical framework 
defined by the use of transition does not directly manifest itself as a crisis 
of a certain theoretical approach.6 Even as the political and social 
promises of transition are melting away, humanities and social sciences 
(especially, but not reducible to, economics, see Turnock 1997; Lavigne 
1999) have a hard time distancing themselves and changing their 
epistemological perspective. The history of the theory of transition 
and the way it aims to fully grasp post-socialist experience as an experi-
ence of radical inherent instability of all social identities is a history 
of the transformation of its central concept, away from being 
an explanandum to being the explanans. Transition has become 
an indicator in a series of processes – cultural, political, institutional etc. – 
growing into an ever widening and conceptually deficient, yet rarely 
questioned, framework. Following its neutralization and consequent 
migration to other social sciences, transition lost its concise meaning 
(as in the work of O’Donnell and Schmitter), which enabled its narrative 
to attain a circular structure. Thus the meaning of the transition is always-
-already present in itself, with the task of scientific practice reduced to 
its simple recovery. 
A second, and more important, issue is that transition is represented 
as a neutral discourse, a simple observation of existing conditions which 
cancels the distance between representation and the object that is represented. 
The social reality of transition is presented as non-discursive, while 
the dominant discourse on transitional reality represents its own self-
-understanding. In this sense we are not simply dealing with modern 
duality of ideology as error and reality as truth: as a signifier transition 
produces the reality it aims to represent. Therefore, if the concept of transition 
is both a theoretical and a political investment, every theoretical intervention 
in explaining the post-socialist condition represents a political interven-
tion (and vice versa). It seems to us that rather than being a strong-point 
for ongoing research on post-socialism and a consequent basis for social 
6   Although the absence of a single dominant theoretical framework is a sign 
of theoretical heterodoxy, it is nonetheless premised on an implicit ontological basis 
being, in Laclau’s words, a disavowal of the fundamentally contingent character 
of the event.
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policy, this often-referred-to obviousness – supported by the incapaci-
tating immediacy provided by the self-evidence of change – should be 
thoroughly criticized. Although the number of critics of transition is steadily 
growing, the implicit teleology which determines the conceptual apparatus 
itself – and for us represents the crucial aspect of the post-socialist condition – 
is usually outside the scope of most critiques.7 For example, whilst noting 
the deficiencies of the conceptual apparatus of transitology in the context 
of analyzing SEE post-socialism, Croatian sociologists Lalić, Maldini 
and Andrijašević maintain that “(...) some transitional countries had 
not managed to realize even the most basic criteria of liberal democracy, 
and thus remain ‘stuck’ on different stations along its [transition] way” 
(Lalić et al. 2010, 31). Thomas Carothers has documented a number 
of “qualified democracies” that political theorists use to describe various 
stages of political transition in certain countries: formal and semi-, electoral 
and façade, virtual and illiberal, weak and partial etc. (Carothers 
2002).8 This kind of evolutionist view was already present in the work 
of O’Donnell and Schmitter, whose approach is often defended 
as “retrospective” and “open” (Jović 2010), even “extreme in embracing 
indeterminacy” (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 264) when attempting to 
define a criteria by which we can “measure the rank of democratization” 
(Jović 2010). But the criteria for this measurement is itself related 
to the “minimal” or “ideal” level of “democratization”, defining therefore 
any departure from it as a deviation or deficit of the unequivocally defined 
regulative ideal. As sociologist Mira Marody has maintained, in transi-
tology “(…) attention was paid mostly to threats and obstacles which 
could hamper the transition” (Marody 1998, 43). Since the declarative 
goal of transition was the creation of democratic political systems with 
corresponding free market economy institutions, the perspective it provides 
7   For example, see the work of David Stark, in which he maintains that to 
escape from the trap of a single theoretical model forced upon numerous countries 
it is enough to insist on its multiplicity: “(...) we should instead regard East Central 
Europe as undergoing a plurality of transitions in a dual sense: across the region, 
we are seeing a multiplicity of distinctive strategies; within any given country, we find 
not one transition but many occurring in different domains – political, economic, 
and social” (Stark 1992, 18).
8   If further proof is necessary for Guilhot’s thesis about the history of the concept 
of transition, consider the quote from Balibar: “This logic of evolutionist approach 
is incapable of thinking in terms of tendencies and contradictions, multiplying 
the indeterminate stages in order to evade the resulting theoretical difficulties” 
(Balibar 1977, 43). Of course, Balibar was referring to the epistemological problems 
of the evolutionary current in Marxism and the way it addresses the theoretical issues 
of the transition to communism – though, the logic of de-politicization is the same.
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constrains us to examine the political life of post-socialism only by 
reducing it to the “infinite task of perfection“ of the existing politico-
economic constellation (Pupovac 2010). The epistemology and political 
praxis of transition cross multiple paths in almost countless names 
of aberrations and deviations from the proposed transitological model: 
one of the less conspicuous but nonetheless present epistemological 
functions of transitology is to precisely define, code and catalogue these 
departures. As an object that aims at scientific legitimacy, transition is defined 
by a mode of normality in which:
Excess or deficiency exist in relation to a scale deemed valid and suitable – hence 
in relation to a norm. To define the abnormal as too much or too little is to 
recognize the normative character of the so-called normal state. This normal (...) 
state is no longer simply a disposition which can be revealed and explained as 
a fact, but a manifestation of an attachment to some value (Canguilhem 1991, 23).
Since deviations can only be defined in relation to the proposed situation 
of normality, their only significance is to secure ontological consistency 
where there is none – in the process of construction of the object of scientific 
analysis. From the perspective of post-foundational political theory, 
transition provides a defence against the radical contingency reactivated 
through the collapse of real existing socialism. In Oliver Marchart’s words 
“(...) the strong [radical] notion of contingency implies that being neither 
impossible nor necessary is itself necessary for all identity” (Marchart 
2007, 29). Although from the post-foundationalist perspective no stable 
identity or social formation can ever be achieved, both are necessary 
in their precarious forms. Transition thus functions as a defence formation 
against the experience of the fact that, as Laclau and Mouffe (in)famously 
stated, “society does not exist“, while at the same time it attempts to 
provide an answer to the question of why it does not exist: only it defers 
the reasons and therefore the possibility of its foundations (in)definitely 
into the future. This (in)finitivity of transitional societies’ foundations is 
at the very core of transitional promise and the crucial aspect of the concept 
itself.
reactivating contingency: towards a post-foundationalist 
approach to transition
One of the most influential contributions to post-foundational political 
theory is the seminal joint work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, 
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published in 1985 under the title Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards 
a Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau and Mouffe 2005). By decon-
structing what they had diagnosed as a reductionist line within Marxist 
thought, the authors take conflict – renamed as antagonism – as their 
central notion. But unlike Marxism, antagonism in discourse theory 
is characterized by materiality and subjectivity: it represents neither 
a concept nor a category since it does not precede its own application, 
nor can it exist outside it. At the same time, it isn’t exclusively reducible 
to it because its main characteristic lies in the fact that it is constituent 
of the very social objectivity whose part it represents. Antagonism is 
crucial for the construction of social relations and as such it is impossible 
to objectively grasp or represent it: “(…) the moment strictu senso 
of the clash, far from being objective, indicates the impossibility of society 
of reaching a full objectivity” (Laclau 2006, 104).
The ontological stake in question becomes clear at this point: 
by maintaining that society is formed as a system in which every identity 
and practice possesses its own meaning Laclau established that, not unlike 
discourse, the social field is comprised of a series of signifiers characterized 
by mutual difference, and whose relationship can be reduced to minimal 
definition – A and not-A. In order for society to be encapsulated in a unity 
which is able to give meaning to its constituent parts, just like every other 
system it needs to establish a limit of exclusion, i.e. decide which hetero-
geneous elements do not belong to it. These foreign elements are assigned 
a new key role in supplying the necessary “material” for the definition 
of the society as an enclosed and meaningful structure. If one of the main 
assumptions of structural linguistics – that meaning is in fact the result 
of a negative operation of difference – is correct, then the existence 
of the whole is necessary since it limits the potentially infinite number 
of mutual differences. Another consequence of this ontology is that 
the breakdown of the dominant narrative is at the same time the sign 
of the breakdown of the social system itself. Laclau named the moment 
when radical contingency becomes visible dislocation, a term which in his 
later works written under the strong influence of Jacques Derrida 
replaced the notion of antagonism as an undeconstructable “foundation” 
(Thomassen 2005, Laclau and Bowman 1999). It is only under a certain 
conditions – such as, for example, the dissolution of a political regime, 
not unlike those seen in the late 1980s and early 90s – that one can 
encounter the groundlessness of a society: 
This revelatory function of dislocation and antagonism is achieved when gaps, 
breakdowns, and interruptions occur at the ontic level of beings. The dislocatory 
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event brings with it an effect of unconcealment, which is the second consequence 
(...) (Marchart 2007, 152). 
While the experience of post-socialism is always-already represented 
(since it is always the experience of the subject, which can only be the subject 
of a discourse), one way to think of post-socialism is to argue that it is 
a space of prolonged dislocation(s), caught between radically divisive 
history and a hopeful yet elusive future continuously undermined. 
Post-foundational ontology precisely allows for the representation of: 
(...) the failure inherent to representability (the moment of clash present 
in antagonism which, as we have said, escapes direct representation) becomes 
itself representable, even if only through the traces of non-representability within 
the representable (as in Kant’s noumenon: an object which shows itself through 
the impossibility of its adequate representation) (Laclau 2006, 105).
This object, at the same time necessary – because it makes meaning 
possible and creates an enclosed totality out of a group of signifiers – 
and impossible – because the relationships of equivalence between the chains 
of signifiers, which constitute the system and which were created by the “exten-
sion” of the system, are unstable by definition – is an empty signifier 
(Laclau 2007). This “signifier without the signified” is situated at the very 
limits of the system and stands for its impossibility to close itself as a stable 
unity of meaning: closure can be achieved temporarily and only by a negative 
operation of exclusion by which the excluded becomes a pure negativity 
according to which the closed system is defined. By radicalizing these 
assumptions and applying them to social analysis we can differentiate 
between “society” and “the social”: ‘the social’ represents a discursive 
terrain within whose framework the meaning is partially fixed through 
suture points which are always the result of a political act which aims 
to create a meaningful whole – society (Laclau and Mouffe 2005). 
The political thus becomes the ontological of the society, a moment 
in which its social “form” or “quality” (democratic, socialist, transitional 
etc.) is decided upon. Because of the fact that Laclau’s discourse theory 
essentially represents a theory of political signification – i.e. a theory 
of formulation and creation of social meaning and identity – we believe 
that it is crucial for the analysis of transition as an empty signifier (Laclau 
2006). Since power is defined as an ability to create the so-called “society-effect”, 
for Laclau a simple relationship of representation in which the representing 
object exists outside and independent of its own representation does not 
exist. Representation is not a secondary phenomenon which mirrors 
an object with an already existing and a “fixed” identity; it always adds 
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to the identity of that which it represents, becoming thus the primary 
terrain for its very construction (Laclau 2006). 
According to this brief outline of Laclau’s theory, transition can’t 
in any meaningful way represent a politically neutral concept, something 
which, we believe, is the fundamental and unquestionable assumption 
shared by all parties engaged in the current process of negotiating 
its effects and consequences. It is rather a politically articulated unity 
in which power and representation are mutually contaminated from the very 
beginning. As a theoretical and political concept its effects are written 
in the social reality itself. Most critiques of the concept of transition 
do not touch upon this level, on which the “the society effect” is created – 
i.e. the dimension of political ontology which makes possible the unified 
meaning of the interpretation of various indicators (be they economic, 
sociometric, cultural etc.).
We maintain that the fact that transition is used to offer all answers 
to the post-socialist condition is not a sign of its strength as a theoretical 
concept, but a problem to be researched. As a legitimate object of knowledge 
and analysis transition possesses the structure of an establishing totality, 
providing a meaning to a historical process which by definition cannot 
have one. It functions as what Louis Althusser named “expressive totality” 
in which “each part ‘conspires’ in the essence of the totality, so that the whole 
can be read in each of the parts, which are total parts (partes totales) homol- 
ogous with it” (Althusser and Balibar 1970, 310-11). Its can “describe 
the effect of the whole on the parts, but only by making the latter 
an ‘expression’ of the former, a phenomenon of its essence” (Althusser 
and Balibar 1970, 310), giving the impression of logical and temporal 
consistency:
If the efficient cause takes precedence, the final cause, the telos of the process 
of change, has to be active from the beginning: it is only as a result of this teleological 
orientation of action that ‘becoming’ acquires a being which it lacks. Becoming is 
intelligible only as far as it is dominated by its telos (Laclau and Zac 1994, 28).
Therefore, since its starting and end points have already been determined 
the possibility for transformation of the concept of transition is minimal – 
the only space somewhat open for political (or academic) discussion is the way 
from point A to point B. Numerous different processes may be named 
transitional and, correspondingly, transition – as a totality of post-socialist 
experience – can only be identified from the position of its always-already 
successful outcome. Therefore, a seemingly minimal and most common 
definition of transition as an “intermediary period” – what Carothers (2002) 
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calls a “grey zone” – already presupposes an ideological mechanism 
of belief in the necessity of its final outcome. We maintain that this is 
the crucial part of the ideological background to the common language 
of “necessary un-popular and painful measures” (Jeffries 1996), a sacrificial 
policy proposed and/or forced onto the citizens of SEE and EE countries, 
(in)famously articulated by former Czech President Vaclav Klaus’s plea 
for “no half-measures” in social reforms (Klaus 1994). It is here that 
this ideological mechanism shows a number of very concrete – one is 
tempted to say material – effects: it allows for the dismissal of political 
issues – such as reduction of social benefits, education, health care etc. – 
as a simple management “cost-benefit” issue of investing in a future 
which is already clearly defined. Political decisions, which reproduce 
the inequality of power, are depoliticized and consequently coded 
in the form of social goals which require “collective sacrifices”. In order 
to continue producing effects, the discourse of structural adjustment 
must find its support in the consensus, which transitional authors avoid 
describing as political, since such a definition attributes a crucial role 
to power, thereby revealing the contingent (i.e. non-necessary) nature 
of the discourse, whose sole legitimacy stems from its supposed necessity 
(as expressed in the infamous “There Is No Alternative“ or “TINA”)9. 
But the implications of eluding the political dimension of transition 
and postulating an unattainable collective agent (i.e. society) which 
serves as a theoretical “get out of jail free” card are far-reaching. As Laclau 
notes, what necessarily accompanies this kind of ahistorical agent which 
corresponds to and manages the process is the idea that the transformation 
of society can be rational – which seems to be one of the main, albeit 
implicit, assumptions of transitology; best illustrated by the idea 
of transition as a subjectless process of managing social “costs” (since, 
by definition, they are required by the certainty of a future outcome 
and can thus only be the result of rational calculation):
If this transformation is conceived as taking place at the level of a rationally 
graspable ground of the social, then the transformation is the work of reason 
and not of ourselves. A rationality transcending us fully determines what is to happen, 
and our only possible freedom is to be conscious of necessity. (Laclau 2007, 102)
It seems therefore that transitional societies simply reinstate one teleology 
in a place of another. It is only the teleological perspective of transition 
9   For an overall argument against the contemporary dominant forms 
of consensual politics (of which transition is but an aspect) and the political 
philosophy on which it is founded, see Mouffe 2005.
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that enables one to talk about its “costs”. Without such an ideological 
horizon of expectations the costs, such as increasing unemployment 
rates, constantly declining living standards, rising poverty, erosion 
of the leftovers of the welfare state, political clientelism etc., suddenly 
turn into its end results (Močnik 2003). As Carothers maintains, 
the often described “feckless pluralism” or “dominant power politics” are a state 
of “normality” and not any kind of interim state to be overcome 
(Carothers 2002). The telos of transition functions as a Derridean supplement 
which becomes an indivisible part not only of the paradigm, but even 
of the concept itself – one which defines the identity of each of the elements 
of the structure it forms: if excluded, the experience of transition would 
ultimately be reduced to heterogeneity and polysemy.
The transitional framework represents a key step towards political 
signification, an attempt at defining social unity as a meaningful system 
by excluding that what is heterogeneous to its structure. But herein lies 
the “trap” of transitional ontology. Its universality – i.e. the framework 
within whose boundaries individual identities are formed – does not 
represent only a particular logic which erases differences among individual 
identities, but rather a logic which becomes a ground that permanently 
“absorbs” differences into itself, becoming a resource for transitional 
teleology itself. It is only by limiting, or by paradoxically including 
heterogeneity in the shape of discursive negativities of the system, 
that transition achieves its unstable ontological coherence. For example, 
in Croatian and post-Yugoslavian social sciences these elements include, 
only to name a few; “chaotic privatization” (Katunarić 2004), “criminal 
or political capitalism” (Cifrić 1998), “(…) a weird symbiosis of market 
absolutism and (…) ethno-national state”, “transitional capitalism”, 
“belated construction of state in the war context”, “return to traditionalism”, 
“the expected reactive nostalgia for safety” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić 
2007), as well as “undemocratic political practice with certain retrograde 
processes” (Maldini 2006)10. As an “empty signifier” in the Laclauian 
sense, transition thus allows for a metaphorical and representational 
closure which stabilizes the meaning of other social and political 
phenomena within the post-socialist context. Therefore a seemingly 
10   The stance of transitologists towards the pre-post socialist past is repre-
sentative of this issue. For example David Lane argues that “processes inher- 
ited from the past may hinder progress and the success of capitalism and market 
relations” (Lane 2007, 3). This position is brought to its most radical, but by no 
means infrequent, conclusion in the work of the French economist Marie Lavigne, 
who maintains that “most of these legacies, if not all, are negative from the point 
of a view of transition to a new system” (Lavigne 1999, 16).
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endless series of metonymic displacements of the dominant discourse 
is neither a limit nor an obstacle to its successful functioning. As Jelica 
Šumič Riha maintains regarding the global dominance of neoliberal 
discourse,11 its structural non-closeness not only does not endanger its hegemonic 
status, but is on the contrary the source of its thriving and success. It is 
only by a process of extension of the semantic field that a unique sense 
of the whole is created, converting previously mutually heterogeneous 
and foreign elements into moments of the defined whole. Transition 
ceases to be a concept (one among others) which is used to designate 
a certain period in history, and is transformed into an ontological support 
to those theoretical approaches that aim to explain post-socialism: it creates 
a singular socio-political process and provides it with a narrative sense. The end 
result of this epistemological transformation is the affirmation of the last 
dominant historical narrative about the end of history, or the inherent 
position of global capital as a continuous circulating structure whose 
legitimacy, regardless of its form, can only be “transitional”.12
Conclusion: A future (beyond) transition?
Transition has provided a theoretical framework for understanding 
a whole array of different social and political processes and phenomena 
at the crucial historical moment of one of the biggest changes of a socio-
-political regime in contemporary world history. Therefore, it is only 
natural to wonder why one should question a concept which aims 
to explain the profound transformation that societies in Eastern and South- 
-East Europe underwent and which apparently does so more-or-less 
successfully?
In this paper we intended to provide a Laclauian discursive analysis 
of the political emergence of the concept of transition, analyzing it 
as a “signifier without signified” (Laclau), a signifier which, by naming, 
aims at creation of the very thing it supposed to represent. We have 
tried to offer several arguments which are crucial to understanding 
the political mechanism of representation which enables one to think 
or be “in transition”. A locus of absolute self-understanding and self-
-identity, transition at the same time represents a common denominator 
11  Unpublished keynote address at the conference “Thinking the political: 
The work of Ernesto Laclau”, University of Brighton, 10-12 April 2013. 
12   For a view of transition as not only a historical but a “logical category” 
of capitalism, see Mezzadra 2007.
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of everyday post-socialist experience as well as a central concept of the social 
and political sciences. Inasmuch as it defined by a political/normative 
dimension, the concept of transition is ideal and at the same time real, 
representing itself as a mere description of contemporary social relations 
and changes. Such a dual nature is defined by the mutual precondi- 
tioning of the positivist tendency for empirical knowledge about 
the changes which took place in societies of former Yugoslavia and other 
East European countries, and the normative dimension of the concept 
which is used to explain such changes (be it, amongst many others, 
modernization, Europeanization etc.). As a closed system of meaning, 
transition connects mutually heterogeneous phenomena by excluding 
elements whose common denominator is negativity toward the estab-
lished totality. Such a theoretical structure, which tries to explain social 
changes through oscillations between normative, i.e. cultural, elements 
and economic trends, proves itself to be incapable of accepting the political 
dynamic of the process in which Society, as a defined and self-enclosed 
totality, shows signs of radical ontological openness. We argue that the transi- 
tional model is ontologically unsustainable and epistemologically useless. 
It does not assure the very thing it was constructed for: elements which 
would help us extrapolate current processes and create predictions for the future, 
nor is it capable even of explaining these without transforming them into 
moments of transitional telos, which in the end results in the hegemonic 
fixation of their meaning. Transition is therefore not only characterized 
by epistemological blindness, but is also ontologically heuristic.
As it represents an attempt at a neutral or apolitical suture of the whole 
post-socialist experience, it aims to replace the grand narrative of socialism 
not so much with another grand narrative – this time of liberal-democracy – 
but with a seemingly politically neutral and subjectless process. Analyzing 
transition as a subjectless process only serves to indicate an inherent 
quality of transitology – for it the subject of transition represents 
a plethora of voiceless acts. In the limited scope of this paper we have 
managed to touch upon only a small fraction of epistemic and hegemonic 
practices which formed the dominant logic of transition. Be it the quasi-
-mythical project of nation-state building, the new theoretical paradigms 
dumbfounded by the constantly changing social reality, of the paternalistic 
Western gaze and its accompanying interpellated East European political 
subject, all come together in the notion of a transitional society. But 
as already mentioned, a political establishment of social meaning can 
never be completely successful; that which remained excluded in the shape 
of radical negativity/positivity in the process of creating identity for the newly 
formed structure will always come back to “haunt” the very thing they 
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it gave its life to. Thus, these various discourses support transition by 
producing its excluded outside: the very nature of transition as an order 
which aims to be nameless, whose sole purpose is to vanish or be self- 
-negated – the moment which is, of course, forever postponed – makes 
it possible to always-already include new causal explanations of ongoing 
events in what Šumić-Riha calls “generalized metonymy”. Transition does 
not explain but makes sense, thus operating under the guise of neutrality, 
causality and purpose.
We have tried to put forth a fairly brief account of transitional knowledge. 
In this limited space it wasn’t possible to encompass all points of divergence 
between different approaches to transition, but we have attempted to 
point out some of its most basic axioms. Its causality makes all the current 
socio-political phenomena one encounters in the research superfluous, 
seemingly incorporating all kind of events as a mere steps in the process 
of its realization. And while its epistemological dismantling can provide 
theory with a far greater scope for analyzing post-socialism then its 
continued use, its ongoing political existence and its persevering teleology, 
interwoven with political desires and optimism, may turn out to be much 
more resistant.
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